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level of government intrusion into an individual's privacy. Given courts' reticence to change the 
way they look at DNA testing, 10 the only way to guarantee the protection of a person's 
expectation of privacy in his or her own genetic information is to ensure that adequate safeguards 
are in place to prevent the abuse of DNA testing, while still respecting the needs of law 
enforcement. New Jersey should have a more streamlined expungement procedure to make it 
easier for those people who are never convicted of a crime to have their genetic information 
taken out of the database. New Jersey should also clarify the legislative findings of the law and 
more clearly explain the timing of the process in which the sample is taken. 
Part II will give a background of the science of DNA testing and an explanation of the 
type of genetic material a person is required to submit under New Jersey's DNA-testing statute. 
This part will also look at advances in genetic science and the difference between the use of 
fingerprints and DNA for identification. 
Next, Part III will provide an overview of New Jersey's DNA-collection statute and its 
evolution over time, becoming more expansive in scope with each revision. This section will 
also examine the regulations that implement New Jersey's DNA-collection statute. New Jersey's 
statutes and regulations make it easy for law enforcement to obtain a person's DNA, but onerous 
to get an innocent person's DNA out of the system. 11 
In Part IV, this Comment will look at how other jurisdictions have justified mandatory 
DNA testing of arrestees and will provide an overview of the special needs test 12 and the 
balancing test. 13 
10 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 20 11). 
11 State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267, 272-73 (N.J. 2007). 
12 Id. 
13 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409. 
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Part V will examine where the Legislature acted appropriately and where it erred in 
drafting New Jersey's DNA testing statute. Part VI will explore what could be changed or how 
the New Jersey law should be implemented to alleviate the privacy concerns triggered by the law 
in its current form. Part VII concludes that New Jersey's DNA-collection statute has potential as 
a useful law-enforcement tool, but certain safeguards should be taken in its implementation. 
II: Background of the Science 
A: DNA Profiles and DNA Samples 
The nomenclature used by courts, legislatures, and law regarding DNA is somewhat 
confusing to the average person. DNA profiles, DNA samples, buccal swaps and single tandem 
repeats; the science and procedure of DNA testing is admittedly complex. Understanding the 
science and procedure behind DNA testing is critical when attempting to identify the 
implications of mandatory DNA testing. 
The first part of the procedure is the taking of a "DNA sample," in which biological 
material is taken from a person. 14 This is typically in the form of either a blood sample or a 
buccal swap, where a sample of a person's epithelial cells is taken from the inside of the cheek. 15 
This sample is used to create a "DNA profile." 16 The FBI established a method to analyze DNA 
samples by measuring the single tandem repeats, or STR' s, at thirteen locations on the human 
genome. 17 These STR's are used for identification because they produce very unique 
sequences. 18 Each stretch of these markers has a different number of STR's measuring different 
lengths, providing for a unique set of measurements and marker repeats. 19 Due to the substantial 
14A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 894 A.2d 31, 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
15 Id 
16 Id at 40-41. 
17 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 400-01. 
18 Id at 401. 
19 ld 
3 
number of genetic markers and the widespread variations among humans, this method is 
extremely accurate.20 This process generates a series of numbers, which in turn becomes the 
DNA profile.21 This DNA profile is then sent to the FBI and entered into the Combined DNA 
Index System ("CODIS"), but the physical DNA sample is retained by whatever agency 
performs the testing.22 In New Jersey, the state police keep the DNA sample.23 
There were two main reasons the FBI originally chose the STR method of DNA analysis: 
(1) this method of identification is extremely accurate-the chances of two people having the 
same DNA profile using the STR method is a virtual impossibility-and (2) the genetic material 
contained at these locations on the human genome was thought to contain "junk DNA. "24 This 
term was adopted because this material was unique to an individual, but did not contain 
"personal" or "useful" genetic information.25 
B: The Truth About Junk DNA 
The state of genetic science has advanced greatly since the inception of DNA testing 
programs in the mid 1990's. In recent years, various studies have uncovered evidence that "junk 
DNA," which was previously selected because it was not thought to contain coding information, 
does in fact contain personal genetic information that can be predictive of physical traits.26 If 
this is the case, the DNA sample the government compels a person to give is a unique identifier, 
containing the genetic information of what a person is, not merely who a person is.27 
20 United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 2011 WL 4359899 (9th Cir. 2011) citing 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (en bane). 
21 A.A. ex rei. B.A., 894 A.2d at 40. 
22 N.J.STAT.ANN. § 53:1-20.21 (West2003). 
23 A.A. ex rei. B.A., 894 A.2d at 40-41. 
24 Jd. 
25 W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 2003, at 47. 
26 See Colloquy, Is the "Junk" DNA Designation Bunk?, Nw.U.L.REv. 54 (2007). 
27 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,409-10 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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The primary justification given by law enforcement for the use of STR's is that this 
method of DNA analysis is minimally intrusive and does not use personal genetic information.28 
But if this is no longer true and more meaningful genetic material is contained on these STR's, a 
person is being forced to give up more personal information than previously thought. For 
example, forensic STR's, such as those used in CODIS, can be predictive ofrace.29 These STR's 
may also be predictive of certain genetic diseases.30 This is most alarming given the fact that one 
of the primary reasons given by proponents of DNA-collection statutes is that a person is giving 
up no more information than if they were required to submit to a fingerprint test.31 Given the 
reality that the genetic material used in DNA-testing contains personal, genetic information-not 
merely a unique random number-saying that STR's are no more intrusive than fingerprints is at 
best misleading. 
C: The Fingerprint Analogy 
Many courts, in their analyses of the reasonableness of DNA testing, point to the minimal 
intrusiveness of DNA testing, specifically how it is no different than taking fingerprints. 32 But 
the differences between the two are obvious. The primary difference between fingerprints and 
DNA samples is a rudimentary one; no biological sample is removed when a person's fingerprint 
is taken. 
Another difference between fingerprinting and DNA testing is the perception of the 
general public regarding genetic testing.33 Fingerprinting is in general use in many areas outside 
28 !d. 
29 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) citing Nat' I Comm. for the Future ofDNA Evidence, 
Nat'] Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing (Nov. 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles 1/nij/183697 .pdf. 
30 See Colloquy, supra note 26, at 59. 
31 See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387,410 (3d Cir. 2011). 
32 See Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409. See also Haskell v. Brown, 677 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
33 See People .vBuza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753,769-70 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 2011), as modified(Aug. 31, 2011), rev. 
granted and opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
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of law enforcement; many professions require fingerprinting as part of a licensing or registration 
procedure.34 DNA, on the other hand, is primarily seen as proof in the detection of violent and 
sexual crimes.35 DNA evidence, due to its prevalence in popular culture, tends to be seen by the 
general public as evidence of either homicide or rape. 36 
While fingerprinting has historically been used as a tnethod of identification, it can be 
slightly misleading to characterize DNA testing as the same. DNA sampling is simply not an 
efficient method of identifying a person upon arrest.37 DNA cannot be used to immediately 
identify a person upon arrest, whereas a fingerprint test may be completed quickly.38 A DNA 
profile must be created from the DNA sample and then sent to CODIS to be filed in the database 
and compared with other samples. 39 This process takes weeks, whereas a determinative 
fingerprint test may be completed in a matter of minutes.40 This is the reason many DNA testing 
statutes and regulations require that fingerprints be taken along with the DNA sample so as to 
identify the sample.41 
Once a person becomes more knowledgeable about the science behind DNA testing, and 
the pros and cons of DNA testing versus fingerprinting, a clearer picture begins to emerge. 
Fingerprinting is a useful, efficient, and cheap method of identification, compared to DNA 
testing. DNA testing requires a technician to draw the blood or take the buccal swab, and a lab 
technician to process the DNA sample to create a DNA profile.42 And with fingerprinting, there 
34 Jd. at 769. 
35 I d. at 770. 
36 ld. 
37 !d. at 771-72. 
38 People .v Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 772 (Cai.Dist.Ct.App. 2011), as modified (Aug. 31, 2011), rev. granted and 
opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) .. 
39 See A.A. ex rei. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 894 A.2d 31, 40 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2006). 
40 Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 772. 
41 See, e.g., N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81 APP. B. (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2004); 
N.C.GEN.STAT.ANN. §15A-266.3A (West 2011). 
42 See N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-2.2 (2007). See also N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-3.1 (2007). 
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are no privacy concerns that an individual is being forced to give up more information than just 
his identity. A fingerprint does not contain any personal genetic information. 
III: The Laws and Regulations 
New Jersey's DNA-collection program has gradually increased in scope since the New 
Jersey Database and Databank Act of 1994. Successive amendments have increased the number 
of people subject to mandatory DNA testing. Initially, New Jersey only collected DNA samples 
from individuals convicted of sex crimes.43 Several years later, New Jersey added other 
convictions for which providing a DNA sample was mandatory.44 Shortly after that, DNA 
sampling was required for all convicted felons. 45 
A: The New Jersey Database and Databank Act 
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, granting 
the FBI authority to create an index of DNA samples, called CODIS.46 Then in 2000, Congress 
enacted the DNA Act, which required the collection of DNA samples from any person who is, or 
has been, convicted of a "qualifying Federal offense."47 In response to the creation of a federal 
DNA index system, New Jersey created its DNA collection program with the enactment of the 
DNA Database & Databank Act of 1994.48 
In the original Act, the Legislature instituted the DNA testing program to aid in criminal 
investigations, specifically to aid all law enforcement agencies, state and federal, in the 
identification of individuals involved in criminal investigations. 49 This version of the Act only 
43 1994 N.J. Laws 1175. 
44 1997 N.J. Laws 1970. 
45 2000 N.J. Laws 834. 
46 42 u.s.c. §§ 13701, 14223 (1994). 
47 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l), (2) (1994). 
48 D.N.A. Database and Databank Act of 1994, ch. 136, 1994 N.J. Laws 1175. 
49 ld. 
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required individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses to provide DNA samples for testing. 5° 
Absent from the original statute was language limiting how long a DNA sample or profile would 
be retained. 51 
In 1997, the Act was amended to require juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain 
sexual offenses, as well as those individuals found not guilty of these sexual offenses by reason 
of insanity to provide DNA samples for testing. 52 The Legislature found that it would be in the 
best interest of the State of New Jersey to include such samples in the DNA database and 
databank. 53 The physical DNA sample is stored in the DNA databank, while the DNA profile 
created from the sample is stored in the DNA database. 54 
In 2000, the Act was amended again to allow for the use of buccal swabs, in addition to 
the blood samples previously used, and to expand the number of crimes for which a DNA sample 
must be provided. 55 These new crimes included murder, manslaughter, aggravated assault, 
kidnapping, luring or enticing a child, and engaging in sexual conduct which would impair or 
debauch the morals of a minor, or any attempt of the above listed offenses. 56 Due to 
technological advances in DNA science and technology, the Legislature found that the use of 
other biological samples would permit a more efficient and effective method of DNA 
collection. 57 The use of samples that did not require blood testing was found to be less intrusive 
50 Jd. 
51 Jd. 
52 1997 N.J.Laws 1970. 
53 ld. 
54 See N.J.ADMTN.CODE §13:81-3.2 (2007). 




to the person being tested and less costly to administer. 58 At the time of the amendment, blood 
tests cost the State ofNew Jersey $1.60 to draw and $40 to test. 59 
New Jersey's DNA Database and Databank Act was amended again in 2003 to require 
all adults or juveniles convicted of any crime, and all persons found not guilty by reason of 
insanity to provide DNA samples for testing. 60 The impetus for this expansion was the success 
of DNA-testing programs in other states that required testing from broader groups ofpeople. 61 
As DNA-testing technology has evolved-making larger-scale testing more cost 
effective-and due to the overwhelming approval of law enforcement, further expansion of New 
Jersey's DNA testing program was inevitable. The previous DNA-testing regimes only affected 
convicted felons, not ordinary people. On August 18, 2011, the Legislature's newest amendment 
to the Act was approved by Governor Chris Christie.62 This amendment requires compulsory 
DNA testing of individuals arrested of certain enumerated violent felonies: murder, 
manslaughter, aggravated assault, kidnapping, luring or enticing a child, engaging in sexual 
conduct that would impair or debauch the morals of a child and any attempts to commit these 
offenses. 63 Every person arrested for any of these offenses is required to provide a DNA sample 
prior to release from custody.64 A person who is arrested is only suspected of a crime and has 
yet to be proven guilty, as opposed to a convicted felon. 65 
58 !d. 
59 Assemb. 209-779, 1st Sess., Appropriations Comm. (N.J. 2000). 
60 2003 N.J.Laws 1312. 
61 Assemb. 210-2016, 1st Sess., Law & Pub. Safety Comm. (N.J. 2002). 
62 2011 N.J.Sess.Law Serv. Ch. 104 (West). 
63 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining debauch as to lead a person astray; to corrupt a person 
with lewdness; to seduce; to mar or spoil). 
64 2011 N.J.Sess.Law Serv. Ch. 104 (West). 
65 Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining felon as a person who has been convicted of a 
felony), with BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defming arrestee as a person who has been taken into 
custody by legal authority). 
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A few noteworthy things stand out about the law, as enacted. First, the Legislature put 
the rationales that courts in New Jersey and around the country have used in justifying 
compulsory DNA testing into the law as legislative findings: (1) the intrusion on an individual's 
privacy interest is minimal; (2) the compelling government interest advanced by DNA analysis 
of those arrested of violent crimes; and (3) it further enhances the State's ability to identify 
offenders.66 The Legislature also inserted language finding a "compelling parallel between the 
taking of DNA and fingerprinting, and that the purposes of DNA testing demonstrate 'special 
needs' beyond ordinary law enforcement. "67 In view of the flaws of this reasoning, 68 it is 
troubling that the Legislature placed this language into the text of the statute.69 This language 
could perhaps present an easy way out of analyzing the dangers of DNA testing, allowing a court 
to rest its laurels on "legislative findings." 
Most troubling of all, however, is the language that was omitted from the enacted version 
of the bill. As originally drafted and introduced by Senator Nicholas J. Sacco, the sponsor of the 
previous versions of the DNA statute, and Senator John A. Girgenti, the amendment contained 
language stating that "Every person arrested for an offense enumerated in this subsection shall 
provide a DNA sample prior to the person's release from custody. If the charge for which the 
sample was taken is dismissed or the person is acquitted at trial, the sample and all related 
records are destroyed." 70 This language was taken out of the bill by the Senate Law and Public 
Safety Committee and was not contained in the version of the bill approved by the Legislature 
66 !d. 
67 !d. 
68 See supra Part II, C. 
69/d. 
70S.B. 737, 214th Leg. (1st reprint) (N.J. 2010). 
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and signed by the Governor. 71 Instead, the language in effect today provides for a procedure 
where an individual may apply for the expungement of his or her DNA profile.72 
As amended, the Act provides that any person whose DNA profile has been included in 
the State DNA database and whose DNA sample is stored in the State DNA databank may apply 
for expungement. 73 The application for expungement is made to the court and must also be 
given to the prosecutor in the county where the charges were brought, twenty days prior to the 
expungement hearing. 74 This 1neans a person arrested but never charged, a person whose 
charges were dismissed, or a person adjudicated not guilty must go to the court and ask to have 
their DNA record removed. In addition, the prosecutor has a chance to protest the expungement, 
which, in any case, the court is not required to grant. 75 If a person has not been convicted, or 
charges have been dismissed, the courts and prosecutors should not be vested with so much 
discretion. Where discretion is given, an opportunity for abuse of discretion exists. 
The statute, as opposed to the regulations currently in place, contains no language as to 
what is deleted from the record upon expungement. 76 Nothing is said as to whether the DNA 
sample is deleted, or just the DNA profile. Neither does any language state how long the DNA 
samples or profiles are maintained. The regulations implementing the amendments should be as 
clear as the current regulations, the DNA sample and profile are destroyed. 77 
B: The Regulations 
71 2011 N.J.Sess.Law Serv. Ch. 104 (West). 
72 N.J.STAT.ANN. § 53:1-20.25 (West2007). 




77 N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-6.1 (2007). 
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New Jersey's Act is enforced by a set of regulations promulgated by the Attorney 
General of New Jersey. 78 These regulations set forth how the Act is implemented, and can be 
drafted in such a way so as to be more or less intrusive. 79 The regulations set forth rules to 
establish procedures in the submission, identification, analysis and storage of DNA submitted 
under the Act. 8° Fingerprints are required to be taken along with the sample and a DNA 
specimen will not be accepted without these fingerprints. 81 The regulations state further, "the 
offender providing a DNA sample shall be positively identified, using photograph identification 
or other identification, by the agency responsible for collecting the sample prior to taking the 
sample. "82 
The regulations also provide safeguards to protect not only the quality of the DNA 
samples and records, but the privacy of those persons from whom DNA has been obtained.83 All 
DNA samples are stored in a storage repository, within a secure storage area, at room 
temperature. 84 All DNA profiles are stored in a secure computer database, and all personal 
identification has been redacted. 85 The DNA profiles are only allowed to be used for certain 
enumerated purposes and access is only to be given to the database and databank under certain 
circumstances.86 For further protection, it is a crime for any person to disclose any individually 
identifiable DNA information. 87 
78 N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-1.1 (2007), et. seq. 
79 For example, this can be done by providing for the destruction of DNA samples and profiles upon expungement. 
80 N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-1.1 (2007). 
81 Id. § 13:81 App. B. 
82 ld. § 13:81-2.1. 
83 I d. § 13:81-2.2. 
84 Jd. § 13:81-3.2. 
85 N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-3.2 (2007). 
86 Id. § 13:81-4.2. For example, the DNA profiles are only to be used for law enforcement, development of a 
population database, research, assist in the identification of human remains and for criminal defense purposes. 
Access to the DNA profiles is only given to the CODIS manager and personnel authorized by the CODIS manager 
or a law enforcement agency with permission of the CODIS manager. 
87 !d.§ 13:81-6.2. 
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The expungement regulations, like the statute, permit a person to petition the court for the 
expungement of his or her DNA records. 88 The regulations provide for the deletion of all DNA 
profiles, records, and identifiable information in CODIS and the destruction of all samples 
obtained in reference to the charge that was dismissed. 89 The regulations also provide for the 
deletion of all electronic records containing any identification information.90 The expungement 
procedure provides for discretion in deciding whether or not to remove an individual's DNA 
records. 91 The regulations should provide for automatic expungement where a conviction is not 
obtained; if law enforcement wants to retain the sample, the onus should be on them to show 
why the sample should be retained. 
Part IV: Judicial Justifications of DNA Testing Statutes 
New Jersey courts have yet to analyze a case involving mandatory DNA testing of an 
arrestee, so this Part begins with an analysis of cases dealing with the older versions of the 
statute. Since other jurisdictions have had mandatory DNA testing statutes in place longer than 
New Jersey, this Part will then examine how the federal judiciary and other states have analyzed 
the subject. Lastly, because of the similarity between the New Jersey and Federal Constitutions, 
it is instructive to look at federal cases interpreting federal DNA testing statutes.92 
A: New Jersey Courts Decisions on Previous Versions of the Act 
A couple of recent cases flesh out how New Jersey courts treated compulsory DNA 
testing of all convicted felons under the 2003 version of the Act.93 While the new law involves 
persons not yet convicted of any crime, these cases provide insight into how New Jersey courts 
88 I d. § 13 : 81-6.1. 
89 !d. 
90 ld. 
91 !d. The request for expungement is made to the Superior Court, Law Division, and a copy of the petition for 
expungement is sent to the prosecutor in the county of conviction and the Division of Criminal Justice, to afford the 
?:overnment an opportunity to contest the expungement. 
2 Compare U.S.CONST. amend. IV, with N.J.CONST. att. I,~ 7. 
93 A.A. ex rei. B.A, 892 A.2d 31; O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267. 
13 
will likely interpret the new Act. These cases also characterize the dangers the new law poses if 
courts continue to rely upon the same faulty logic as they have in the past. 
First, in State v. O'Hagen, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the 2003 version of the 
Act as constitutional under both the Federal and New Jersey Constitutions.94 In 0 'Hagen, the 
defendant had pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled dangerous substance and was 
sentenced to three years in prison. 95 At sentencing, the trial court required the man to provide a 
DNA sample for testing, pursuant to the Act. 96 O'Hagen argued that the testing violated the 
United States and New Jersey Constitutions as an unreasonable search and seizure as well as a 
violation of equal protection.97 
Looking at other courts' treatments of similar acts, the court determined that either a 
"special-needs" test or "totality of the circumstances" balancing test could apply.98 In applying 
the special-needs test, the court balances the government's interest in a special need, beyond that 
of ordinary law enforcement, with an individual's privacy.99 The balancing test, in comparison, 
focuses on the individual's expectation of privacy. 100 A convicted felon, out of jail on probation, 
has a diminished expectation of privacy compared to members of the general public. 101 The test 
balances two factors: (1) the intrusion into a person's reasonable expectation of privacy; and (2) 
the degree to which the intrusion is necessary for the promotion of legitimate government 
. 102 Interests. 
94 State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267 (N.J. 2007). 
95 !d. at 270. 
96 Jd. 
97 ld. at 149. 
98 I d. at 272-77. 
99 !d. at277. 
100 0 'Hagen, 964 A.2d at 274. 
101 !d. 
102 Jd. at 274 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006)). 
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The court chose to apply the special-needs test, relying upon prior practice and other 
instances of warrantless, suspicionless searches. 103 The court felt that the special-needs test, 
which was more stringent, is a more appropriate standard. 104 In this case, O'Hagen's main 
argument was that the sample required by the Act was not a valid special-needs search because it 
did not further a "special need," but rather furthered an ordinary law-enforcement interest. 105 
The court concluded that the DNA tests did not serve an ordinary law-enforcement interest, but 
rather the program existed for the purpose of identification. 106 
After deciding that DNA testing served a "special need" beyond that of ordinary law 
enforcement, the court moved on to balancing the special need against the privacy interests of an 
individual. 107 The court relied upon the minimal physical intrusion of a blood test or buccal 
swab and the analogy between DNA and fingerprints and held that the government's interests 
outweighed the defendants. 108 The court's reasoning in 0 'Hagen followed the status quo in 
DNA testing. 109 
A number of problems exist with the court's reasoning in this case. First, the special 
need of identification is already filled by a widely-used, efficient, and cost effective method: 
fingerprinting. Second, the court's statement that a DNA test is no more intrusive than 
fingerprinting or photographing and that DNA is just a means of identification 110 is an 
oversimplification of a complicated issue. Third, fingerprints are required to be taken as per the 
regulations implementing the Act. To say that identification is the "special need" served by such 
103 Jd. at 277, citing Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. ofEduc., 826 A.2d 624 (N.J. 2003). 
104 I d. at 277-79 (stating the special-needs test is more stringent because if no special need beyond that of ordinary 
law enforcement is shown, the court does not even move on to the balancing of private and public interests). 
105 ld. at 277-79. 
106 I d. at 279 (holding that DNA testing of a convicted person "extends beyond ordinary law enforcement and 
presents a special need that may justify the privacy intrusions at issue.") (internal quotations omitted). 
107State v. O'Hagen, 964 A.2d 267, 279 (N.J. 2007). 
108 I d. at 279- 80. 
109 /d. at 279. 
110 !d. at280. 
15 
tests is hardly realistic, when that identification is already fulfilled by some other method. The 
court's dismissal of O'Hagen's privacy concerns regarding DNA testing seems to run contrary to 
reality as well. The court addressed O'Hagen's concerns in two lines of text: "defendant's 
concerns are unfounded because those future privacy interests may be protected by the 
courts."111 The fact that safeguards are in place to protect an individual's genetic information 
once a DNA sample is taken is of little comfort to a person who should not have been compelled 
to provide a sample in the first place. 
Next, in A.A. ex ref. B.A., the court analyzed a situation where a juvenile was adjudicated 
delinquent for aggravated assault. 112 On the date the 2003 amendments went into effect, A.A. 
was required to provide a DNA sample for analysis. 113 The juvenile's parents, along with 
another man convicted of possession of a controlled substance, filed a complaint against the 
Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, alleging that the amendments violated both the 
federal and state constitutions. 114 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that without a post-sentence 
expungement, the Act would deprive them of due process. 115 The trial judge held that the Act 
did deprive plaintiffs of due process unless it was modified to include a right of expungement 
upon completion of sentence, and the State appealed the ruling. 116 
The Appellate Division in A.A. ex rei. B.A. relied upon previous cases and decisions in 
other courts to uphold mandatory DNA testing of convicted felons as a valid search within the 
special-needs exception to the warrant requirement. 117 Plaintiffs argued that the special-needs 
111 !d. at 279-80. 
112 A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 894 A.2d 3l(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2006). 




117 A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 894 A.2d 31,44--47 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2006) (citing Treasury 
Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,674-75 (1989)); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 854-59 (9th Cir. 
2004); Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg'l High Sch. Bd. ofEduc., 826 A.2d 624, 642 (N.J. 2003). 
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exception did not apply because the Act is designed as a tool for law enforcement. 118 The 
Appellate Division side-stepped this argument, however, and focused on the Legislature's goals 
in deterring recidivism and concluded that this alone was a "special need" beyond ordinary law 
enforcement. 119 The court then concluded that the state's interest in deterring recidivism was an 
"undeniably compelling" interest. 120 The court principally relied upon the fact that DNA is an 
extremely reliable method of identification and that "accuracy in investigation and prosecution 
serves the ends ofjustice." 121 
In the second part of its analysis, the court concluded that intrusions into offenders ' 
reasonable expectations of privacy were minor because the physical intrusion is minimal and the 
analysis of DNA is not overly intrusive. 122 The court gauged its analysis of DNA testing on the 
"fact" that the STR method of analysis focuses on genetic markers and does not reveal any 
information other than a person's identity; in essence it was a DNA fingerprint. 123 The Appellate 
Division was unmoved by plaintiffs' claims that advances in DNA technology may make these 
invasions more intrusive. 124 
The court's decision in A.A. ex rel. B.A. is troubling in a couple of respects. First, the 
special needs analysis conducted by the court follows flawed reasoning. The principal use of 
compelled DNA testing is to have DNA profiles on file to solve crimes, not the immediate 
identification of a person to ensure the apprehension of the correct individual; that is what 
fingerprints are used for. The DNA profiles are compared to evidence in cold cases or compared 





122 Jd. at 51-52. 
123 A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. ofN.J., 894 A.2d 31, 52 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2006). 
124 Jd. 
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contrary to reality. Solving crimes is the quintessential police function, and any search that is 
conducted with the primary purpose of solving crimes is not a "special-needs" search. 125 The 
presence of other "special-needs" incident to the primary need of normal law enforcement cannot 
elevate a standard search to one of special-needs. 126 Yet, the court did not question the 
government's justification of the search. 
The Appellate Division principally relied upon the DNA/fingerprint analogy in its 
justification of the search in A.A. ex rei. B.A. 127 When the case was decided in 2006, when DNA 
technology was not as advanced as it is today, the court gave short shrift to plaintiffs' concerns 
that the information being provided was not as benign as the government contended. 128 The 
dangers which the court was so quick to dismiss as science fiction are not so far-fetched. 129 It is 
becoming increasingly likely that the DNA used in the STR process is not just a "DNA 
fingerprint," but contains personal genetic information. 130 Scientific studies and evidence of this 
were available in 2007, so it is curious that the Appellate Division ignored the possibility that the 
DNA-testing process took more than a "fingerprint."131 
Beyond the concerns with the courts' reasoning 1n these cases, there is a more 
fundamental problem. If the courts' conclusions in these two cases show anything, it is that 
society and the judiciary have little regard for the privacy of convicted felons. This may be 
justified. But what happens when it is not the privacy of a convicted felon that is at stake, but the 
125 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (holding that searches conducted to further the 
purpose of detection of general criminal wrongdoing do not qualify as special needs searches). 
126 I d. at 46-47. In a special needs analysis, the court is to determine the primary purpose of the search. If the 
primary purpose of the search is that of general law enforcement, the search does not qualify as a special needs 
search. In Edmonds, the court struck down the warrantless, suspicionless searches conducted at checkpoints 
searching for narcotics. The government argued that the secondary goal of keeping impaired motorists off the street 
qualified the searches as special needs searches, regardless of their primary objective. The Court declined to follow 
this view. !d. 
127 A.A. ex rel. B.A. v. Attorney Gen. of N.J., 894 A.2d 31, 47 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2006). 
128 Jd. at 52-53. 
129 See Gibbs, supra note 25 . 
130 See Colloquy, supra note 26, at 59. 
131 See Gibbs, supra note 25. 
18 
privacy of a person who has not been found guilty of any crime? The fact that the persons 
involved in 0 'Hagen and A.A. ex ref. B.A. had been convicted of crimes must have colored the 
courts' analyses. Courts should not so easily justify the subordination of the rights of an 
individual to the government's interest in identification, particularly if that individual has not 
been convicted of any crime. 
B: Other Jurisdictions Justifying Compulsory DNA Testing of Arrestees 
Since New Jersey's newest amendments are not yet in effect132, and therefore have not 
been interpreted by any court, it is useful to see how other jurisdictions have analyzed statutes 
that compel the production of a DNA sample from arrestees. The majority of cases have upheld 
mandatory DNA testing of arrestees for fundamentally the same reasons that New Jersey courts 
used to uphold compulsory DNA testing for convicted felons. 133 But a further analysis into the 
courts' reasoning in these cases, as well as the cases where mandatory DNA testing of arrestees 
was not upheld, provides a more thorough understanding of a court's analysis of the interests 
involved in mandatory DNA testing. Such an analysis can also suggest ways to modify a statute 
so as to best preserve an individual's right to privacy while recognizing and respecting the needs 
of law enforcement. 
In a recent decision, the Third Circuit analyzed a federal law requiring the collection of 
DNA samples from individuals who are arrested. 134 A man was arrested for possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute. 135 Following indictment, the government required the man to 
provide a DNA sample. 136 The man refused to provide a sample, on the ground that the statute 
132 See 2011 N.J.Sess.Law Serv. ch. 136 ("This act shall take effect on the first day of the 18th month following 
enactment"). 
133 See O'liagen, 914 A.2d 267. See also, United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion vacated, 
659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011). 
134 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(l)(A) (2006); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011). 
135 !d. at 389. 
136 I d. at 390. 
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violated the Fourth Amendment, and the District Court agreed, holding the statute 
unconstitutional. 137 The District Court refused to follow the DNA/fingerprint analogy and 
determined that the need for identification was not a compelling state interest that outweighed 
the defendant's privacy interests. 138 The District Court described comparing fingerprinting and 
DNA profiling as "pure folly. " 139 
The Third Circuit reversed, applying the totality of the circumstances test and relying 
upon the diminished privacy interests of those arrested and the compelling government interest 
in properly identifying arrestees. 140 The court dismissed the defendant's two main arguments 
against DNA testing: (1) that the sampling and creation of a DNA profile was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment; and (2) that the use of the STR method, revealed more 
information than identity. 141 The court, while acknowledging defendant's fears , concluded that 
hypothetical concerns about the use or misuse of DNA do not have a "substantial weight in [the] 
totality of the circumstances analysis."142 Primarily, the court pointed to the fact that the STR 
process does not use coding DNA and protections built into the Act to dispel any concerns over 
. 143 pnvacy. 
The defendant also tried to argue that DNA cannot be equated with fingerprinting for the 
purposes of a privacy analysis. 144 The court disagreed, holding that individuals that are arrested 
get fingerprinted all of the time as part of the booking process. 145 Fingerprinting is used for the 
purpose of identifying prisoners and to determine whether an arrestee has been previously been 
137 United States v. Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d 597 (W.D.Pa. 2009). 
138 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 390. 
139 Mitchell, 681 F.Supp.2d at 608 ("Such oversimplification ignores the complex, comprehensive, inherently private 
information contained in a DNA sample"). 
140 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 416. 
14 1 /d. at407. 
142 ld. 
143 I d. at 407-08. 
144 ld. at 409. 
145 ld. 
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convicted. 146 When a person is arrested, his identity is a matter of government concern and he 
cannot claim privacy in it. 147 The defendant's final argument concerned the indefinite retention 
period of his DNA sample. 148 
The dissent in this case highlighted the most glaring problems with the reasoning that has 
been adopted en masse by jurisdictions across the country. First is the short shrift given "to an 
arrestee's expectation of privacy in his DNA, reducing it to an interest in identity only." 149 It is 
misleading to say that DNA is only used for identification. The real purpose is not to identify, 
but to use the DNA profile to aid past and future prosecutions. 150 Proponents of DNA-collection 
statutes argue that the genetic material used in a DNA profile contains "junk-DNA," however, if 
law enforcement retains the original sample of genetic material, it has a person's full genetic 
code. 151 
In Pool, the Ninth Circuit upheld the DNA sampling provisions of the Bail Reform 
Act. 152 The court held that where a court has made a judicial determination of probable cause to 
believe a person has committed a felony, the government's interest outweigh an individual's 
privacy interests. 153 Pool was charged by indictment with possession of child pornography and 
was arrested and arraigned. 154 As a condition of pre-trial release, Pool was compelled to provide 
a DNA sample. 155 The court, applying the totality of the circumstances test, found that the 
146 Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 409. 
147 !d. 
148 !d. at 410. No time limit was written into the statute, but the Court held he did not have standing to raise this 
issue because his sample had not yet been taken. 
149 Jd. at416 (Rendell , J. , dissenting). 
150 !d. at422-23. 
151 !d. at 424-25. 
152 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2006); United States v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010), opinion vacated, 659 F.3d 761 
(9th Cir. 2011 ). 
153 Pool, 621 F.3d at 1214-15. 
154 !d. at 1215. 
155 !d. 
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intrusion of Pool's privacy was minimal. 156 Pool tried to argue that given the nature of genetic 
information, the intrusion was greater than the slight physical intrusion would appear. 157 The 
court dismissed this argument, and focused on the limitations of the CO DIS system, particularly 
the use of "junk-DNA", which the court stated may only be used for identification and does not 
contain personal information. 158 The court also relied upon the fact that a judicial determination 
of probable cause had been made, and Pool's expectation of privacy was diminished because of 
this. 
The primary concern with the type of reasoning employed by the court in this case, like 
others, is the ignorance of the pace of technological increases and the increasing role of new 
technologies in law enforcement. 159 As technology continues to improve, if society becomes too 
numb to the point that there is no longer a reasonable expectation of privacy in a person's DNA, 
such testing will no longer be considered a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and 
the government will be free to do what it pleases. 160 The progressive justifications for expanding 
the scope of DNA testing, from certain convicted felons, to all convicted felons, to arrestees, can 
only lead to one outcome: every person will be included in the database. 161 CODIS could easily 
expand to include more and more people, just like fingerprints. 162 
The endorsement of mandatory DNA testing of arrestees is not unilateral. A case from 
Nebraska highlights the concerns courts have regarding DNA-testing statutes. 163 A man was 
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, and a buccal swab was forcibly taken from 
156 !d. at 1215. 
157 Jd. 
158 Jd. at 1214-15. 
159 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004). 
160 ld. at 873. 
161 !d. 
162 ld. 
163 United States v. Purdy, No. 8:05CR204, 2005 WL 3465721 (D. Neb. 2005). 
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him by police officers when he was arrested pursuant to Nebraska law. 164 The law allowed law 
enforcement officers to obtain physical evidence from individual to aid in identification, which 
included the collection of DNA samples from certain offenders for use in criminal 
investigations. 165 In addition, defendants are permitted to obtain DNA testing for the purposes of 
exoneration. 166 The status of offenders is an important part of the analysis of an individual's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 167 Convicted felons and persons released from jail on parole 
have a diminished expectation of privacy compared to the general public. But, while arrestees 
may not have as great an expectation of privacy as members of the general public, their 
expectation of privacy not diminished to the level of a convicted felon. 168 
While identification of arrestees may be a constitutionally sound and legitimate purpose 
for obtaining DNA, the court found Nebraska's statute did not have adequate safeguards to 
prevent population-wide genetic screening. 169 The primary problem was that the statute did not 
provide a list of crimes for which DNA testing would attach; the police were authorized to test 
all individuals in police custody. 170 A.person arrested for but not convicted of a crime cannot be 
forced to provide DNA for the purpose of identification without a showing that this DNA would 
identify him as the person who committed the crime; probable cause to arrest is not necessarily 
probable cause for a DNA search. 171 In addition, a search through compulsory DNA sampling 
and analysis must be authorized by a neutral magistrate if it is to pass constitutional muster. 172 
164 !d. at* 1. The DNA sample was taken pursuant to NEB.REY.STAT. § 29-3304 (West 2000). 
165 NEB.REV.STAT. §§ 29-3301,29-3302 (West 2000). 
166 NEB.REY.STAT. § 29-4116 to -4125 (West 2001). 
167 Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721 at *5. 
168 !d. at *6. 
169 !d. 
170 !d. Under the statute as it was written at the time the case was decided, any person arrested of any crime, felony 




The Fourth Amendment requires that reasonable inferences from evidence should be made by a 
neutral and detached magistrate and not an officer in the field. 173 
A recent California case most clearly articulates the problems with DNA testing of 
arrestees in general, and the specific flaws in a DNA-testing system that is not implemented 
properly, in one simple sentence: "the effectiveness of a crime-fighting tool does not render it 
constitutional."174 In 1998, California enacted a law that required DNA samples to be obtained 
by law enforcement from all persons convicted of specific offenses. 175 The purpose of the Act 
was to assist law enforcement in the identification and prosecution of criminals, the exoneration 
of the innocent, and the identification of missing persons. 176 In November 2004, akin to the 
recent amendments made to New Jersey's law, the Act was greatly expanded in scope to compel 
the warrantless search and seizure of a DNA sample from any adult arrested or charged with a 
felony! 77 In this case, Mark Buza was arrested for trying to set a police car on fire, and after 
arrest, but before being arraigned, he was asked to provide a DNA sample. 178 The man refused 
and he was charged with an additional crime of refusal to provide a DNA sample. 179 In its 
analysis, the court pointed out the flaws of this system. 18° First, focusing on the physical 
intrusion of a DNA test is misleading; the true search is the analysis of the DNA and the creation 
of a DNA profile. 181 Also, while other courts and legislatures may claim that the purpose of a 
DNA testing program is to identify those who are arrested, the court here did not waste time with 
173 Purdy, 2005 WL 3465721, at *7. 
174 People .v Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 783 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 2011), as modified (Aug. 31, 2011), rev. granted and 
opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011). 
175 CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 295-300.3 (West 1998). 
176 !d. at 756-57. 
177 Jd. at 757. 
178 !d. at 754. 
179 Jd. 
180 Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d at 753. 
181 !d. at 760. 
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semantics. 182 It was obvious that the purpose of DNA testing was to assist law enforcement in 
solving ongoing criminal investigations. 183 The court also pointed to the fact that many felony 
arrestees are never convicted and many are innocent of the crimes for which they have been 
arrested. 184 Yet, in spite of this fact, arrestees' DNA profiles and samples are retained forever, 
unless they go through a burdensome expungement process. 185 
Courts at the federal and state level have justified DNA-testing of arrestees along three 
primary rationales: ( 1) a person who is arrested has a diminished expectation of privacy, and the 
government has an overwhelming interest in identification; (2) DNA-testing is no more intrusive 
than fingerprinting; and (3) DNA-testing is effective. While some jurists acknowledge that the 
ends do not always justify the means and that DNA is not like a fingerprint! 86 these courts 
appear to be the exception, not the rule. On the other hand, these courts interpreted laws 
different from the New Jersey statute. 
V: Pros and Cons of the New Jersey Law 
Given how New Jersey courts have analyzed previous versions of the Act, and how other 
jurisdictions have justified other statutes compelling the production of DNA samples from 
arrestees, it is a logical conclusion that New Jersey courts would find that the practice of 
obtaining compulsory DNA samples from arrestees is constitutional under both the Federal and 
New Jersey Constitutions. New Jersey courts, as well as most others, have relied, and continue 
to rely, upon the analogy between DNA testing and fingerprints, as well as the diminished 
182 I d. at 768. 
183 Jd. at 780. 
184 Id. at 782. 
185 Buza, Cal.Rptr.3d at 783-84. 
186 See People .v Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 2011) (Kline, P.J.), as modified (Aug. 31, 2011), rev. 
granted and opinion superseded, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011); United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Rendell, J. , dissenting). 
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expectation of privacy that arrestee has as compared the general public. 187 Given these realities, 
the only way to protect a person' s expectation of privacy in their own DNA is to ensure that 
adequate safeguards are in place to protect a person's genetic information. With the statute the 
way it is now, there are several problems that should be addressed in the application and 
execution of the Act. 
The first problem with the statute is the way the DNA testing is executed and justified. 
The statute, mirroring the opinion of many courts, identifies a "compelling analogy" between 
fingerprints and DNA, and the use of DNA in identifying a person. 188 This is disingenuous for 
two reasons. First, an increasing amount of research and science show that the type of genetic 
material used in DNA testing carries far more information than a fingerprint can. 189 Second, it is 
plain to see that the purpose of DNA testing statutes is to solve past, present, and future crimes. 
If the courts and Legislature were candid about the primary purpose of a DNA testing program, it 
could help to legitimize the program. The Legislature was cognizant of the rationales that courts 
use to uphold statutes, and aimed to make it easier for a court to justify DNA testing of arrestees 
under the special needs test that New Jersey applies. 190 Third, a person is compelled to provide a 
DNA sample upon arrest, without any determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate. 191 
Under this scenario, a person arrested of one of the enumerated offenses in the stat\if would be 
compelled to provide a DNA sample, even if the person is never charged with an offense. 
Fourth, the Act does not contain an adequate mechanism for the expungement of an 
innocent person's genetic information. While most courts discount the expectation of privacy a 
187 See supra note 11 . 
188 2011 N.J.SESS.LAW SERV. Ch . 104 (West). 
189 See Colloquy, supra note 26. 
190 See supra note 45. The Legislature must have been aware of the reasoning used by courts in upholding similar 
acts. By putting the purpose of identification in the legislative findings of the bill , the Legislature provided a 
convenience to the courts. 2011 N.J.SESS.LAW.SERV. Ch. 104 (West). 
191 2011 N.J.SESS.LAW SERV. Ch . 104 (West). 
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felon has in his privacy, what happens if an innocent person is arrested? Most courts dismiss as 
irrational a scenario in which DNA could be taken from an "innocent" person; if such DNA was 
taken, there is a simple and efficient process to right the wrong. 192 This may or may not be true. 
In Tennessee, a man was falsely arrested and charged with two counts of aggravated burglary, 
and forced to provide a DNA sample to law enforcement. 193 Tennessee law provides that any 
person arrested for a violent felony, as described by statute, shall have a biological sample taken 
for the purposes of DNA analysis after a magistrate or grand jury makes a determination that 
probable cause existed for the arrest. 194 Although it is impossible to guarantee that no innocent 
person is ever arrested, it is possible to make sure the system in place does not retain an innocent 
person's DNA indefinitely, with only a half-baked plan in place to provide for a citizen to get his 
or her DNA profile and sample out of the database. 
Some claim that these risks are overblown and that the safeguards in place prevent the 
misuse of a person's genetic information; 195 however, no system is infallible. The New Jersey 
statute is reasonably well-drafted, but could easily be improved. New Jersey's statute is limited 
in scope to the classes of people from whom a DNA sample may be extracted. 196 The statute 
identifies specific violent and sexual crimes for which a person may be compelled to submit a 
DNA sample. 197 However, even with the limiting criteria in the amendment, a large number of 
people would be subjected to mandatory DNA testing. Between 2007 and 2009, almost 30,000 
people were arrested for crimes that would subject them to mandatory DNA testing under the 
192 See, e.g., N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-6.1 (2007) (providing for a procedure for the expungement of DNA profiles 
and samples). 
193 Brown v. City of Franklin, No. 3101146,2011 WL 2971092, at* 1 (M.D. Tenn. July 20, 2011). 
194 !d. 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011). 
196 See supra note 62. 
197 See supra note 73. 
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new Act. 198 If just one percent of these arrests did not lead to a conviction, the State would 
require DNA samples from 300 people never convicted of a crime. Coupled with a burdensome 
expungement process, this would create a situation where an increasing number of individuals, 
who have never been convicted of any crime, have their genetic information on file. 
An area where the New Jersey Act seems to get it right concerns the expungement itself, 
rather than the process of obtaining expungement. When a person does manage to get a DNA 
record expunged from the database, it is clear what exactly is deleted. 199 The law and regulations 
state that where a person obtains an expungement order, the DNA sample is destroyed, the DNA 
profile is deleted from the computer database, and any other electronic records containing 
personal identification information is deleted.200 This is important because if only the profile is 
deleted, than this "expungement" would not really remove anything. The State would be free to 
use the DNA sample still in its possession to create another DNA profile. In New Jersey's case, 
there is no danger of this because all information, including the biological samples, is destroyed 
upon expungement. 
VI: Prospective Changes to the Law 
Given how courts in both New Jersey and elsewhere have analyzed the issue of 
mandatory DNA testing, the history of the New Jersey DNA-testing statute and the language in 
the newest amendment to the statute, a few changes could be made to the law, or adopted in the 
regulations implementing the law, to better safeguard individual privacy while addressing the 
legitimate needs of law enforcement. 
198 See NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, 2009 UNIFORM CRIME REPORT, available at 
http://www.nj.gov/njsp/info/ucr2009/pdf/2009 _uniform_crime_report_b.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 20 11). 
199 N.J.ADMIN.CODE § 13:81-6.1 (2007). 
200 Seeld. §§ 13:81-1.1 to -7.1. 
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The biggest change that should be made to New Jersey's law is that which is also the 
least likely to happen: courts should stop relying on conclusory statements that a DNA testing is 
in place for identification purposes and to start to address the real concerns about the information 
citizens are forced to hand over to the police. New Jersey courts, in their analysis of DNA 
testing, have concluded that DNA testing serves the special need of identification, when the 
purpose is clearly to solve crimes through the use of DNA evidence.201 If the purpose of the law 
is to solve crime, then DNA searches upon arrest would be subject to the warrant requirement. If 
courts stopped relying on the analogy between DNA and fingerprints and were not so quick to 
dismiss the scientific evidence that the genetic material used in DNA testing contains personal 
information, it might become more difficult for courts to endorse compulsory arrestee DNA 
testing. 
While courts across the country have started to scrutinize compulsory DNA-testing 
schemes more closely, the majority are maintaining the status quo and New Jersey's courts are 
likely to do the same. Due to this fact, it is critical that the New Jersey Legislature places 
adequate safeguards in the law, and not leave it up to the judiciary to vindicate the rights of the 
wrongfully accused. The process for expungment of a DNA record is the same as that for the 
expungment of a conviction. 202 A person must petition the court, and so long as the county 
prosecutor and the judge do not object, the record is expunged?03 First, New Jersey should 
guarantee a method for a person who is wrongly arrested or not convicted of any crime to have 
his or her DNA sample and profile removed from the databank and database. As the law is 
201 Compare State v. O'Hagen, 914 A.2d 267 (N.J 2007) with People .v Buza, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 753 
(Cal.Dist.Ct.App. 2011 ). 
202 N.J.STAT.ANN. §§ 2C:52-1 to -52-32 (20 11 ). 
203 Jd. §§ 2C:52-10, 52-11. 
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written now, this situation is not guaranteed, it is only a possibility.204 The laws and regulations 
should clearly state that when a person is cleared of the charges brought against them, the DNA 
sample and profile are deleted, along with all other records, as had been in the original version of 
the bill.205 The process should not force a person to have to jump through administrative hoops 
to remove their personal information which, as the facts or a court has determined, should never 
have been taken in the first place. 
Some of the changes proposed must be affected by the Legislature-i.e., removing the 
DNA fingerprint analogy language from the legislative finding-but others do not. While it is 
unrealistic to expect that these changes will be addressed by the Legislature, given how recently 
the statute was passed, the most logical choice would be to implement them through the 
regulations. The Attorney General can draft the regulations in such a way as to streamline the 
expungment process, while still maintaining the DNA samples of dangerous felons who "get off 
on a technicality." 
VII: Conclusion 
Mandatory DNA testing has been an increasingly useful technique for law enforcement to 
solve crimes, identify suspects, and exonerate innocent individuals. New Jersey's own DNA-
testing system has been in place since 1994 for precisely these reasons. Originally only requiring 
testing of those persons convicted of sexual crimes, the scope of this program has been increased 
through the years, leading to the most recent amendment that expands DNA testing to 
individuals arrested of certain enumerated violent offenses. New Jersey's law does contain some 
safeguards, but the potential for injustice should give a citizen pause before fully endorsing this 
latest amendment. 
204 See N.J.STAT.ANN. §§ 53:1-20.17 to -20.37; N.J.ADMIN.CODE §§ 13:81-1.1 to -7.1 (2007). 
205 SeeS. 214-737, 2d Sess. , Law & Pub. Safety Comm. (N.J. 2011). 
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There are a few problems with New Jersey courts' analysis of compulsory DNA testing. 
First of all is the reliance of courts on the special need of identification as a compelling enough 
government interest to override an individual's interest in the privacy of his genetic 
information?06 Courts have relied on two intertwined, flawed assumptions to justify these 
programs. First, courts rely on the faulty analogy between DNA profiles and fingerprints. 207 
Courts relegate DNA profiles to containing only identification information, much like 
fingerprints are a unique pattern that serves only to identify a person. But advances in science 
and teclmology have begun to show that this statement is not necessarily true. 208 Second, the 
DNA selected to be tested in DNA testing programs was originally thought to not contain any 
personal genetic information, but recent studies have shown that these "useless" segments of 
DNA do in fact contain personal genetic information, and are not as benign as originally 
thought. 209 Given this information, courts should not be so quick to give personal privacy 
interests a cursory afterthought when balancing public and private interests. 
An alternative, and more realistic approach would be to make sure New Jersey's laws and 
regulations contain adequate safeguards to protect personal privacy interests. Taking everything 
into account, New Jersey's DNA Database and Databank Act is neither perfect nor fatally 
flawed. A couple of changes could be made to New Jersey's law which would satisfy both the 
interests of law enforcement and the privacy interests of New Jersey's citizens. Amending the 
statute to require a judicial determination of probable cause before testing and streamlining the 
expungement process would help to more properly balance the interests of law enforcement 
while respecting the privacy interests of the individual. 
206 See supra Part IV, A. 
207 See supra Part ri, C. 
208 See supra Part II. 
209 See supra Part II, B. 
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The primary problem with New Jersey's Act as amended is the language that was taken 
out of the bill when it was in committee, which would have provided for an automatic 
destruction of any DNA samples, records and profiles upon the dismissal of any charges or the 
failure of conviction for the charge for which the DNA sample was taken.210 If the statute was 
amended to include this language, or language to this effect was put into any regulations 
promulgated by the State, the concern would no longer be as great. The State would not be 
retaining an innocent person's DNA, subject to an expungement process that only promises the 
possibility of the removal of private genetic information. No problem exists with the 
expungement itself, only the inefficient process in which it is implemented. 
Another problem with the Act in its current form is DNA is to be taken from a person 
arrested, before they are released from custody.211 The statute is silent as to whether charges 
must be brought, or whether any type of judicial determination must be made before the sample 
may be compelled?12 Again, fears that this process could be abused would be assuaged if the 
sample could not be taken until formal charges have been brought. This would ensure the 
existence of other credible evidence as the basis of the arrest, lending more justification for DNA 
testing. The prevention of baseless testing would save time and money. Addressing these issues 
would help to ensure legitimacy of the DNA-testing program and protect innocent people from 
unfounded intrusions into their privacy. 
210 See supra Part V. 
211 See supra Part III. 
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